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POST-NEOLIBERAL ACADEMIC VALUES: 
NOTES FROM THE UK HIGHER EDUCATION SECTOR 
 
NICK COULDRY, GOLDSMITHS, UNIVERSITY OF LONDON 
 
 
 
‘In lending itself too much to the purposes of government, a university fails its higher 
purpose’.1 
 
William Fulbright’s language of ‘higher’ purpose, tendered in 1970, sounds quaint 
now, but the idea that the contemporary university has for decades experienced a conflict of 
values is important.  A recent UK version of such a conflict is worthy of discussion . For 15 
years UK academic production has been intensively regulated, first through the Research 
Assessment Exercise (‘RAE’), where ‘higher education institutions’ (HEIs) received core (ie 
basic institutional) research funding  calculated by reference to the performance of those 
disciplinary  ‘units’ that submitted for peer evaluation sample research ‘outputs’ and 
documentation on overall research production. This is to be replaced by a ‘research 
excellence framework’ (‘REF’). My focus addresses the link between such research 
regulation and wider economic pressures within the discourse of neoliberalism.2 Developing 
a counter-rationality to neoliberalism provides one test of whether the university itself can 
still matter. 
                                                                                                                                                                               
The UK ‘higher education’ sector is distinctive. Excepting sectors such as medicine, law and 
business, UK universities have (by US standards) low or non-existent endowments, relying 
more on public funding and student fees. Public funding is managed nationally (by the 
government’s agency for the university sector, HEFCE) and open to lobbying by university 
unions, industry and other national sources. The management of higher education is in other 
2 
 
respects less centralized than in some European countries, such as France, with no central 
government control over appointments, teaching contracts or curricula and an open labour 
market. Research funding is potentially available across the disciplinary field, including the 
arts and humanities, and not limited to the physical and medical sciences and the most policy-
focussed social sciences. This chapter considers how research is regulated in this context. 
3The form that market forces have taken in the UK HEI sector is unique. Under the RAE, 
assessment has been managed through a structure of ‘subject panels’ operating through peer 
assessment; in the past 2-3 years the university sector, particularly the arts and humanities 
and social sciences, has diverted a UK Treasury attempt to switch evaluation entirely to a 
citations base. Note the rigid disciplinary divisions that underlie the ‘subject panel’ structure. 
This is like a family tree which allocates academic areas to different family branches. It is 
proposed to reduce the number of subject panels. Until now media and communications 
research has been evaluated as a subpanel (called ‘Communication, Cultural and Media 
Studies’) within a larger main panel that includes Library and Information Management. Next 
time media research can hope at best to comprise an informal subgroup within a panel partly 
populated by library scientists. The powers of such informal groups are unclear; the likely 
recognition of interdisciplinary research – for example with Philosophy (dealt with by a 
different panel from Media) or Sociology (in an entirely different branch of the family tree 
from Media) - is even more unclear.  
The regulatory ‘teeth’ of this system lie not in the harmless sounding values that it 
serves (‘research excellence’) but in the self-regulatory behaviour it engenders. Of course 
other systems can have similar effects. So in the largely US debate about ‘public sociology’ a 
number of writers complain about the culture of overproduction generated by the US tenure 
system.4 This has long been the complaint of UK academics labouring under the RAE, where 
the requirement of at least four ‘outputs’ per assessment period (usually one monograph and 
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three peer-reviewed articles over 5-6 years) has been the norm. But the proposed new 
framework (REF) deepens and widens government’s management of the research process in 
ways that are worth following. 
 
The Rise of the Impact Entrepreneur? 
REF allocates only 60% formally to the ‘excellence’ of research, 25% to ‘impact’ and 15% to 
‘research environment’.5 The formal weight given to impact at 25% may be negotiated 
downwards, but its importance is non-negotiable. Evaluated ‘units’ (such as departments) 
must establish their excellence across all three elements including ‘the following key 
characteristics of excellence’: 
a. Production of a portfolio of high-quality, original and rigorous research, 
includingwork which is world-leading in moving the discipline forward, innovative 
work pursuing new lines of enquiry, and activity effectively building on this to achieve 
impact beyond the discipline, benefiting the economy or society. 
b. Effective sharing of its research findings with a range of audiences. 
c. Building effectively on excellent research through a range of activity leading 
tobenefits to the economy and society, including engagement with a range of 
stakeholders in developing and conducting its research and applying findings. 
d. A high-quality, forward-looking research environment conducive to a 
continuing flowof excellent research and to its effective dissemination and 
application. 
e. Significant contributions to the sustainability and vitality of the research 
base.6  
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Getting the highest score on research quality, while ignoring ‘impact’ and ‘environment’ 
(which incidentally takes account of levels of project-based research funding), is not an 
option. Impact is, implicitly, the telos at which all research development should be aimed.  
Why might ‘impact’ have disturbing consequences for the ‘university that matters’? 
First, securing ‘impact’ for one’s research means more than promoting it within academic 
settings: ‘we do not intend to include impact through intellectual influence on scientific 
knowledge and academia – this is fully recognised within the “outputs” and “environment” 
elements of the REF’.7 To qualify as research at all, work must already have been ‘effectively 
shared’, whatever that means.8 Second, the process for ‘building on’ research in ‘excellent’ 
departments is assumed to involve liaising ‘with a range of stakeholders in developing and 
conducting [] research and applying findings’:9 consulting stakeholders in advance on what 
research they might find interesting will no doubt be rewarded.  
 
Third, the proposed definition of impact is problematic: 
 
Impact: An assessment of demonstrable economic and social impacts that 
have been achieved through activity within the submitted unit that builds on 
excellent research . . . to make a positive impact on the economy and society 
within the assessment period.10  
This definition is glossed in a footnote: ‘throughout this document, where we refer to 
“impact” or “social and economic impact”, we include economic, social, public policy, 
cultural and quality of life impacts’. Nonetheless two yawning gaps are apparent. ‘Public 
policy’ covers work within domains currently recognised in public policy, but what of work 
that is critical of public policy, and of the parameters set for public policy? Clearly such work 
cannot show influence on public policy, yet there is no wider recognition of influence on 
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politics or civil society. At a stroke the public engagement with civil society that Michael 
Burawoy envisaged for ‘public sociology’11 is ruled out. Nor is there allowance for work 
whose impact is transnational, or at least not securely caught within the container of the 
nation-state.12 There is clear tension within a framework that claims to reward research for its 
international excellence (‘world-leading’ in the jargon) yet assesses its impact by consulting 
exclusively national stakeholders, including non-academic endusers who will assess ‘impact’. 
All this without even touching on the difficulties of showing impact of any sort if you work 
in philosophy, history, classical languages . . .   
Then there are wider normative questions. A highly contestable external value 
(impact) is being translated into a measurement system, with all the rigidity and pressure 
towards commodification that implies. The idea that research should sometimes aim to 
influence the practices of those beyond the academy is hardly objectionable; it informs 
important developments such as ‘action research’,13 and has been the subject of conflicted 
debate inside the academy since Max Weber14 and, later, the birth of critical sociology.15 But, 
as the recent debate over ‘public sociology’ shows,16 there is little agreement either 
(strategically) about which ‘publics’ are the appropriate ones to address or (tactically) about 
whether better research is produced by not aiming directly at impact and allowing this to 
develop as a side-effect or (practically) about how far a healthy research environment can 
exist without a range of work that is unconcerned with external impact (general theory, 
investigations into methodology). If self-generated debates on the ‘public value’ of research 
are unresolved, how can ‘impact’ (or any similar term) be appropriately imposed as a 
‘measure’ by government - without undermining the reflexivity about research’s aims that 
should be internal to academic fields?  
University ‘research units’ will be required to submit an ‘impact statement’ as part of 
their submission to the research assessment process. The accumulative language in which 
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such statements are described assumes that the products of research can be pre-calibrated in 
terms of their ‘impacts’ just as economic outputs are. For some academic subjects the 
measure may be plausible (civil engineering?) but its general relevance is far from obvious: 
‘it is pie-in-the-sky to think that an administrator in Bristol [home of HEFCE] is going to 
come up with [a measure of research impact] that economic consultants have been chasing 
for decades’ (Jonathan Adams, director of research evaluation for Thomson Reuters quoted 
Guardian, 13 October 2009).  However, the mandatory prioritizing of economic and market-
based values is characteristic of neoliberalism. There is a sociological word for the importing 
of external measures and values into a distinctive field of production: heteronomy.17 
The REF proposals are, as I write, the subject of intense lobbying by discipline 
associations, universities, trade unions and individuals, with a petition lodged on the 10 
Downing Street website that calls for research to be evaluated by excellence alone.18 We do 
not  yet know what concessions from HEFCE will be extracted, although such concessions in 
turn may be trumped by government fiat, backed by the threat to cut government-supported 
research activity even more drastically. Let me concentrate instead on a wider question: what 
are the implications of a university system (such as the UK’s) introducing a heteronomous 
value into academic life that competes directly with the notion of peer-assessed research 
quality (I leave aside debates about the negative consequences of evaluating research in terms 
of measured ‘outputs’: that’s another story)? What incentives remain under the new system 
for anyone (especially those seeking to enter the profession) to plan research with no 
discernible potential for ‘impact’? How will we stop the rise-to-dominance of ‘impact 
entrepreneurs’ whose research is preformulated to demonstrate impact easily? We know 
enough about the influence on the university of the pharmaceutical industries or the military-
industrial complex not to be naively surprised at such a possibility.19 But the UK case 
represents the normalisation of such heteronomy across the whole sector. Many UK 
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academics are worried – most vocally in pure sciences, philosophy and literature – about the 
consequences of the new framework for sustaining any university that might matter. 
The wider UK context is one of neoliberal governmentality. A recent policy document 
by the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills which oversees universities leaves no 
doubt as to the organising purpose of the proposed changes: ‘those institutions that can 
demonstrate a track record of delivering [economic] impact from their research will be 
rewarded’.20 The same document illustrates Nikolas Rose’s concept of ‘governing through 
freedom’ perfectly: ‘freed to define their own strategies for achieving core national priorities, 
our universities and colleges have innovated and adapted . . . The chief role of Government is 
to empower [universities] to deliver.’21 
 
Habits of resistance 
We cannot respond to such pressures except, as Andrew Ross has argued, by  
being clear-sighted about the conditions of our own practice.22 We must recognize our 
location in the ‘neoliberal university’,23 where the internal damage to professional and 
personal values from market conditions is a fact of life no worse perhaps, but also no less 
disabling, than in the non-academic domains whose processes or products we research. It is 
incoherent (but fully consistent with Foucault’s understanding of the productivity of power) 
for academics to admire Richard Sennett’s analysis of ‘corrosion of character’ in 
contemporary economies24 or Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello’s analysis of the destructive 
side-effects of ‘the new spirit of capitalism’25 without considering how those same conditions 
may be corroding ‘us’.26 
Academic freedom is of course not a natural fact, but a contingent construction, 
sustained by compromises between conflicting forces (government, business, civil society, 
the general public). The values we develop for defending academic autonomy are not 
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decorative, but essential to our practice. For a time perhaps, those values could be assumed as 
consensual but not now. Consider the words of the police superintendent hero/antihero of 
Jose Saramago’s novel Seeing, published in the wake of the 2003 declaration of war on Iraq: 
“not only are the people in government never put off by what we judge to be absurd, they 
make use of absurdities to dull consciences and destroy reason.”27  
 
With those words in mind, the resources from which resistance might be constructed 
are worth considering.  Broadly speaking, solidarity is important but how best can we support 
each other? I have been struck over the past five years how, when with colleagues from close 
by or from afar we have read texts together or created time to discuss each other’s work in 
detail, people have remarked on how rare, and how needed, this is. Under conditions of 
intensified and externally directed individual competition, it is important to create spaces for 
more open exchange and to conduct our practice in ways that sustain a sense that each other’s 
work matters. Too obvious perhaps to state as a value, except when we realise it is only by a 
collective effort that the systemic threats to research autonomy can begin to be challenged 
(individually we may protect ourselves from the storm for a while, yet collectively and for the 
future all lose). That means acknowledging how the ‘spirit of system’ (Samuel Beckett)28 
leads us to impose unnecessary ‘system-like’ demands on our colleagues, not least on those 
just entering the academic world, the doctoral students: do the deadlines and requirements for 
conformity we regularly impose upon each other serve any real purpose? More broadly, we 
must translate this principle into transnational solidarity, since, if  national regulatory 
structures as in the UK are ambiguous in incentivizing transnational collaborations, it is we, 
as academics, who must work hard to sustain them. 
We must also not fall into the trap of accepting a narrowly instrumental role for the 
university that undermines individuals’ and groups’ ability to reflect for themselves on why 
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their work matters and to whom.29  I will not therefore offer any blueprint for how the 
university should matter. Questions of how research might matter cannot be reduced to a 
formula, for their inherent contestability constitutes one of the distinctive key areas of 
academic freedom. Pressure on academic autonomy is part of wider transformations in 
governments’ relations to ‘professional’ and other work sectors under neoliberalism (in the 
UK, medical practitioners, schoolteachers, and so on). There thus may be a practical benefit, 
as well as a point of principle, in building alliances between academic workers and other 
workers whose conditions of autonomy are threatened. But these would not be easy alliances 
nor should they be ones which ignore the distinctive privilege that comes with academics’ 
relative influence over symbolic production.30  
 
The role of post-neoliberal values in the university 
What are the values underpinning our practices as researchers (and teachers) in the 
university that require defence against heteronomous measures such as ‘impact’? Though the 
exact ways that values are embodied in knowledge vary across disciplinary areas, whatever 
our discipline we must recognise neoliberal discourse’s common transformation of the 
university and other professional sectors in the UK and elsewhere. In a recent book,31 I have 
tried to articulate some of the values in terms of which resistance to neoliberal discourse – 
what Wendy Brown calls a ‘counter-rationality’ to neoliberalism - might be built.32 The core 
value I identify is ‘voice’: the act of valuing, and choosing to value, those frameworks for 
organizing human life and resources that themselves value voice (as a process). By voice as a 
process, I mean the embodied process of giving an account of one’s life and its conditions, 
what Judith Butler33 has called ‘giving an account of oneself’. That argument developed 
elsewhere about voice was not formulated with the conditions of the university in mind, but 
let me explore briefly how it might apply here.  
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In sociological research, which is where broadly I locate my own work, voice as a 
value translates into foregrounding attention to how voice as a process is reproduced and 
deformed in the wider world (through what I have called ‘sociologies of voice’).34 Such 
attention to voice is inseparable from two other things: a need to understand the wider 
material conditions in which voice occurs or does not (levels of inequality, structures of 
access to resources and power); and a need to register the complexities of individual and 
collective voice and the saturation of those complexities by the workings of power. When 
translated into research practice, voice would involve a certain quality of attention to the 
structures of the world we share and the voices within it. This guiding orientation is precisely 
not reducible to producing work that fits neatly with the self-perceived interests of 
institutional actors (measurable ‘impacts’); it is a reflexive value that  connects with the wider 
role of pedagogy in helping ‘students come to terms with their own power as critical 
agents’.35  
The current crisis of the university in the UK certainly presents opportunities to 
develop new types of practice that resist neoliberal values, quite simply, by acting differently. 
One example is the NYLON doctoral students network formed by Richard Sennett at the 
London School of Economics and Craig Calhoun at New York University to which I have 
contributed since 2002.36 This network is built on regular sessions and annual conferences 
where graduate students present their work and field data for close reading by peers and a 
small group of faculty. NYLON values the craft of fieldwork: it brackets out the increasingly 
instrumental reshaping of research within the academy. Such examples will never simply be 
reducible to general values.   
Let us not forget however the underlying point: what is at stake in such examples is 
the ability of research to offer an independent and open view on the world. Neoliberalism is 
not just, or even primarily, an epochal shift in techniques of governmentality; it is a specific 
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and contestable ideology of action that prioritizes market-based values over other values.37 
Here an essay by journalist and holder of a PhD in biology, Barbara Ehrenreich, well known 
for pioneering work on contemporary US labour conditions, provides inspiration. After 
discussing what she practically needs from academics, she comments:  
I come to sociology not only as a journalist-slash-consumer seeking quick 
answers . . . I also approach sociology as a kind of social thinker myself . . . 
When I approach sociology from this vantage point, I am looking for 
something I can only call companionship: other people who are, like me, 
trying to understand what the hell is going on here, in the society or societies 
we find ourselves embedded in.38  
Her bold attitude towards established disciplinary boundaries is completely incompatible with 
the regulatory framework for research to which we are becoming used in the UK:  
A question-driven discipline, as opposed to a mere chunk of academic turf, 
must reach out to other disciplines. When the question drives the researcher, it 
may propel the researchers in surprising directions. I am not talking about 
being merely “interdisciplinary”; I am talking about a complete disregard for 
the disciplinary boundaries laid out in the early twentieth century  a sociology, 
or least a public sociology, that is more like journalism – willing to go 
anywhere in pursuit of answers’. 39   I like the sense of adventure and urgency 
that informs Ehrenreich’s words and work. She captures better than many 
others why I became an academic. When in future years we look back at 
today, Ehrenreich may prove to have captured well the quality of research-
focussed attention that we are, in our wider battles, fighting to retain. 
 
Postscript 
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The Conservative-Liberal coalition government that succeeded New Labour after the May 
2010 election has delayed implementation of REF by one year without changing its 
principles. Vince Cable, Secretary of State for Business with ultimate responsibility for 
universities, announced in September 2010 that scientists 'should abandon work that was 
"neither commercially useful nor theoretically outstanding"' (quoted Guardian  9 September 
2010). The practical implications are as yet unclear. 
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